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Abstract
 
An intrusion detection system (IDS) is used to determine when a computer 
or computer network is under attack. Most contemporary IDSs operate by 
defining what an intrusion looks like and checking traffic for matching patterns in 
network traffic. This approach has unavoidable limitations including the inability 
to detect novel attacks and the maintenance of a rule bank that must grow with 
every new intrusion discovered. An anomaly detection scheme attempts to define 
what is normal so that abnormal traffic can be distinguished from it. This thesis 
explores the ways that an unsupervised technique called "clustering" can be used 
to distinguish normal traffic from anomalous traffic. This thesis will also explore 
an attempt to improve upon existing clustering algorithms to improve anomaly 
detection by adding in limited amounts of a posteriori knowledge. 
1 Introduction 
The purpose of an intrusion detection system (IDS) is to determine when a computer or 
computer network is under attack. Intrusion detection systems take many forms. The form most 
common in commercial systems is that of a rule-based system. These systems detect intrusions 
by matching network traffic patterns against a bank of patterns for known intrusions. Though 
this technique has been the most successful to date, it has certain unavoidable limitations. First, 
a rule-based system relies solely on its bank ofknown intrusions. This means that it will never 
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be able to detect a new intrusion until that intrusion has been discovered and documented as a 
rule in the rule bank. Secondly, the rule bank must grow with every new intrusion discovered. 
This means that the bank of rules will at some point become large enough to cause problems 
with storage and ability to be searched. Thirdly, these rules must be written by IDS experts, 
meaning that end users cannot be fully independent. They must continually receive new rules 
from the experts. 
These problems can be overcome by anomaly detection techniques. This approach seeks 
to determine what is "out of the ordinary" and to mark it as "intrusive". Because of the huge 
amounts of network traffic that exist on any network, it is an extremely difficult task to label 
traffic as either nornlal or anomalous. Therefore many experts see a need for anomaly detection 
techniques that do not require labeled data. One approach to accomplishing this goal is to build 
clusters ofnetwork traffic. This works by dumping huge amounts ofnetwork traffic into a grid 
and letting a computer group the data. It can then be inferred that the data in larger groups 
constitute normal traffic and the data in smaller groups constitute anomalous traffic. 
The goal of this research was to explore this form of anomaly detection. A variety of 
established clustering algorithms will be implemented and tested. In addition, an attempt was 
made to improve the accuracy of these algorithms through modifications in the implementations. 
2 Unsupervised Learning 
There are two general approaches to machine learning. The first, and most common, is 
called "supervised learning." It comprises the categories ofmachine learning algorithms in 
which an "instructor" is involved. The "instructor" in a supervised learning algorithm is the set 
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of correct labels for all examples. For unsupervised learning, no such labels exist and, therefore, 
learning must be done independently of such advance knowledge. 
It is obvious that a supervised learning algorithm will yield better results than an 
unsupervised one as more information will lead to a more accurate classification function. One 
might be tempted, because of this fact, to try to use supervised learning techniques for intrusion 
detection. However, this may not be the best approach. The data used for a machine learning 
technique for intrusion detection is network traffic. A supervised learning algorithm requires 
labeled data, but because a network experiences such huge amounts of traffic, it would be 
impossible for any organization implementing one such IDS to have intrusion detection experts 
label all of that data so that it could be used for learning. Therefore, it 
makes much more sense to develop unsupervised learning techniques that 
can be applied to the data in its natural form. 
One form ofunsupervised learning that seemed to lend itself well 
to the problem of intrusion detection is called "clustering." A clustering 
algorithm is one that takes a large number of individual data pieces and 
groups them based on similarity. The next few sections will discuss the 
different clustering algorithms that were explored and implemented 
throughout this research project. 
2.1 K-Means Clustering 
The K-Means clustering algorithm [I] is a popular unsupervised 
learning technique. Given an integer constant k, and a group of data, the 
algorithm will partition the data into k distinct groups based on the Figure 1 
K-Means Algorithm 
Choose k different 
examples to be 
centroids 
Associate each example 
with its n'"..Mest centroid, 
fonning clusters 
Make the average ofan 
examples in the cluster the 
new centroid ofthe duster 
Yes 
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similarities and differences of the data examples. The algorithm is given in Figure 1.
 
Despite its excellent accuracy, the K-means algorithm suffers from two major problems 
that make it not a suitable candidate to act as the clustering agent in an intrusion detection 
system. The first is due to the parameter k that must be passed so that the algorithm knows how 
many clusters to make. There does not seem to be any way to automatically generate the value 
ofk prior to running the algorithm. It may be possible for an expert to determine what k should 
be before running the clustering algorithm, but this is clearly something that should be avoided 
since it is our goal to minimize the amount of expert knowledge required to prepare and run the 
intrusion detection system. Because ofthis problem, a few variations ofK-Means, such as Y­
means [4], which is described in the next section, have emerged that do not require a predefined 
value for k. 
The second major problem that dooms the K-Means algorithm's viability as a tool for 
clustering in an intrusion detection system is its time complexity. The algorithm passes over the 
entire list of examples in the data set an indeterminable number of times. Despite the fact that 
the algorithm is guaranteed to converge, it may take an extremely long time for this to occur. 
This is a problem inherent to the nature of the K-Means algorithm and it cannot be overcome 
through slight modifications. 
2.1.1 The Y-Means Algorithm 
One ofthe variations ofK-Means that was created to overcome the problem of 
dependence on a predefined value for the number ofclusters is the V-Means algorithm [4], 
developed by Guan et al. The V-Means algorithm begins by choosing a random value for k that 
is between one and the number of instances in the data set. It then begins an iterative sequence 
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like that ofK-Means but with the added steps of splitting clusters that are too large and merging 
clusters that overlap. In doing this, it is hoped that the algorithm will converge on the ideal 
number of clusters, thus having generated the value ofk without having known it ahead of time. 
During this research, the Y-Means algorithm was implemented and tested it as the 
clustering component of an intrusion detection system. The problem that arose in the 
implementation, however, was that unless the data had clearly defined clusters, groups of data 
that are very similar and very distinct from all other Insert all examples 
into workspace 
data, the algorithm would not converge. The problem 
was in the process of splitting and merging. If there 
were no clearly defined clusters in one area of space, 
then an endless loop of splitting and merging of the 
same data points would begin. When tests were run 
on the implementation, this problem was encountered 
and no test runs using the V-Means algorithm ever 
completed. 
2.1.2 K-Means with Splitting 
In order to have a variation ofK-Means that is 
not dependent on a predefined value for the number of 
Take one sucl!
clusters but that was not subject to the infinite loop 
Choose k different
examples to be
centroids
Associate each example 1+-----..,
with its nearest centroid, 
forming clusters
Mak-e the average ofall 
examples in the duster the
new centroid ofthe cluster 
>---I~ example and make it 
Yes the centroid ofa 
problem ofY-Means, the implementation was changed new-clUster 
to not perform any merging of clusters. The flow 
chart of this modified algorithm is shown in Figure 2. 
Figure 2: K-Means Algorithm with Splitting 
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It quickly became obvious in testing that this was a much better approach because it was 
able to converge without problems. I found with my implementation that the fear that the 
designers of the Y -Means algorithm had that without a merging process, too many clusters 
would exist was unwarranted. Throughout testing, clearly defined clusters were kept as a single 
unit. It could be argued that in less clear portions of the example space over-splitting did occur, 
but this is ofno real consequence because the only effect it would have is to lower the chosen 
value ofp, the proportion of clusters marked as "normal," when the intrusion detection portion of 
the system takes effect. 
2.2 Portnoy's Clustering Algorithm 
The algorithm proposed by Leonid 
Portnoy [7] was the final clustering method to 
be implemented. A flow chart for the 
algorithm is shown in figure 3, to the right. 
Portnoy's algorithm has a definite 
running time advantage over the K-Means 
and its variations. This is because the 
algorithm only requires one reading of the list 
of data examples. It works by taking each 
example one at a time, and placing it in the 
cluster of the centroid that is nearest to it. If, 
however, the example does not fall within the 
tvhke tlre example 
tlre centroid ofa 
new cluster 
Figure 3: Portnoy's Clustering Algorithm 
threshold of any cluster, then the example is used as the centroid of its own, new cluster. 
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The downside to Portnoy's clustering algorithm is that it is not as accurate as any of the 
previously discussed algorithms. This is because it is dependent on the order of the data 
examples. Obviously, a point that is in the middle of a cluster should serve as the centroid. But 
with Portnoy's algorithm, there is no guarantee of this. 
2.3 The Standardized Space 
For all of the clustering algorithms discussed, with the exception ofK-Means, a constant 
cluster width value w is required in order for the algorithm to know when to create new clusters. 
This quickly brings up a few questions about the value. One must first, ask how w is determined. 
To this question, the general response is that different values ofw must be tested until one is 
found that provides desirable detection and false-positive rates. The second major question 
pertains to fact that the choice for w seems directly related to the data. For instance, if an 
algorithm is asked to cluster four one-dimensional points: a=O, b=l, c=9, and d=10. It would 
seem obvious that these points should be grouped into two clusters and that an appropriate width 
to achieve this might be w=2. Thus points a and b would make up a cluster, as would points c 
and d. If the four points were instead a=O, b=10, c=90, and d=100, it would still seem obvious 
that they should be grouped the same way. However, using a value of w=2 for the width would 
result in four separate clusters. 
In his paper, Leonid Portnoy proposes a technique, which he calls Normalization, for 
solving this problem. His idea is to use the standard deviation of each individual feature to 
perform a linear transformation that maps each example to a new standardized space. In order to 
do this, the average and standard deviation of the data must be generated. The average is the 
point in the same space as the original data, represented by a feature vector, where each feature is 
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the average of all of the feature values for all of the data. Mathenlatically, the average is 
represented as: 
avg[j] =!I example; [j] 
n ;=1 
where n is the total number of examples in the data set and vector[j] means the jth feature in the 
feature vector. 
The standard deviation, also represented as a feature vector, is generated from the 
average. Each element of the vector contains the standard deviation of that particular feature 
across the entire data set. The formula for generating standard deviation is: 
stdDev[j] = ! I (example; [j] - avg[j]Y 
n ;=1 
It is important to note Portnoy's choice to represent standard deviation as a vector. Some 
other implementations used standard deviation only as a single value. In doing so, however, 
valuable information was lost. It is important to store the standard deviation for each feature 
separately because this allows us to transform each point coordinate by coordinate to varying 
degrees. To demonstrate, let us look at the two-dimensional example of finding the standard 
deviation of the points (1, 1) and (3, 1). The average will be the point (2, 1) and the standard 
deviation will be (1, 0) since: 
stdDev[O]= ! I(exampleJO]-avg[O]Y = !((1-2Y +(3_2y)=~1 (1 2 +1 2 )=.Ji =1 
2 ~ 2 2 
stdDev[1]= ! I(exampleJ1]-avg[1]Y = !((1-1Y +(1_1y)=~1(0 2 +02)=.JO =0 
2~ 2 2 
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Once the standard deviation vector has been calculated, we are able to transform data 
points into the standardized space. The formula for carrying out this transformation is: 
d · [.] example[j] - avg[j]I· pOInt) = ------­norma lze 
- stdDev[j] 
This formula means that the transformation taking place is to graph each data point not by its 
original values, but by the number of standard deviations it is away from the average. So to 
1 2 1
continue with our example, the point (1, 1) will be transformed to ( ~ , 1~ ) = (-1,0) in the 
3 2 1
standardized space and the point (3, 1) will become ( ~ , 1~ ) = (1,0). Note that since 
division by zero cannot occur, any value ofzero in the actual implementation of the standard 
deviation vector should be changed to a value that is extremely close to zero, such as 1x 10-30 • 
So, to see the effect, let us assume that a cluster width of l1J=0.5 is used to cluster the 
points given in the example. Since the points are more than half ofone unit apart, they will be 
grouped separately, as we would hope. Now, let us assume a different set ofpoints {(4.0, 0), 
(4.2, O)}. Ifwe use the same cluster width of l1J=0.5 to group these points, we will end up with 
both points in just one cluster since they are more than 0.5 units apart. This, however, is not 
what we want because, intuitively, if there are only two points, they should make up two groups. 
Now, ifwe use Portnoy's normalization process on the new set ofpoints we will again get 
standardized points of(-1, 0) and (1,0). Therefore, we can clearly see that using a cluster width 
ofY1F0.5 on both sets ofpoints will achieve the desired result of two clusters for each. 
2.3.1 Additional Effects of Normalization 
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The normalization technique proposed by Portnoy also has other effects not directly 
addressed in his paper. First, by performing this normalization, we are able to even out the 
effects of individual features on the measure ofdistance between points. Say, for example, that 
we have the data set {(O.OI, 1.0), (0.02, 200.0)}. Without normalization, the second feature 
would completely dominate the measure ofdistance between these points. However, with 
normalization, these points will be translated to (-1, -1) and (1, 1) respectively, thereby weighting 
each feature appropriately so that the features have an even effect on distance. 
The process ofnormalization also has the effect of exacerbating anomalies, which is an 
effect that is extremely helpful to us. To demonstrate, let us look at an example dataset of one­
dimensional points that has 25 instances of the point a=(I.O), 24 instances of the point b=(I.OOI), 
and one instance of the point c=(I.2). The point a " which is the translation, or normalized 
version, ofa, will be roughly (-0.160367631). Similarly, b '=(-0.124571284) and 
c '=(6.99890159). So, we can see that the distance between points a and b was originally 0.001, 
but after normalization, the distance is 0.035796347, which is a small change since the points 
started out very close. However, the distance between band c, which started out as 0.199, has 
made a major change, to 6.87433031. 
This technique was also important in coming up with a solution to the question of 
distance measures for discrete features addressed in the next section. 
2.4 Measuring Distance 
In these algorithms, there is much discussion about distance between examples in space. 
The way that distance was measured between examples for the purpose of clustering was to use 
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the Euclidean distance. The Euclidean distance between two points (PI, P2, ... , Pn) and (qI, q2, 
... , qn) is defined as: 
So, according to this, the distance between the points (1, 3, 2, 4) and (3, 4, 2, 1) would be: 
This method is straightforward when all of the features in the example space are 
measured in continuous terms. However, the inevitable question arises as to how to deal with 
features that are measured in discrete terms. The method that was devised for this project's 
implementation was to simply define the subtraction operation for discrete terms as follows: 
O, if a = b,
For discrete terms a and b, a - b = {1, if a "* b. 
A difference of°for equal terms is intuitively obvious because there should be no 
distance between things that are the same. However, the arbitrary selection of a difference of 1 
for unequal discrete terms may not seem to make sense. While it is true that the value of 1 is 
arbitrary, it should not matter when we are measuring distance. This is because of the 
transformation process taken from the paper by Portnoy. Because this we know that this 
transformation will occur, it does not matter what the value of the difference is, so long is it is 
not 0, because it will be scaled according to the standard deviation of the entire data set so that it 
has the appropriate effect on the distance measure. 
We can see how this modified version ofEuclidean distance works but looking at an 
example of the difference between two points with discrete terms. According to this modified 
definition, the distance between the points (1, true, 2, true) and (3, true, 2, false) would be: 
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3 Clustering for Intrusion Detection 
The clustering ofdata does not automatically lend itself to classification for intrusion 
detection. The purpose of intrusion detection is to label a particular example as either normal or 
anomalous. Clustering alone, however, does not perform a binary classification. Therefore, we 
must convert the many clusters generated by the algorithm into two distinct groups. Weare able 
to do this with a few important assumptions. The first assumption is that similar traffic will be 
spatially located close together. This means that when we apply a clustering algorithm to our 
data, similar traffic will most likely be clustered together. This will result in relatively 
homogenous clusters. This is important because in order for clustering to help us detect 
intrusions, we must know that, for the most part, normal traffic will be clustered with other 
normal traffic and intrusive traffic will be clustered with other intrusive traffic. 
The second assumption is that the amount ofnormal traffic is significantly higher than 
the amount of intrusive traffic. This assumption is important to us because it means that clusters 
of intrusion examples will be very small when compared to clusters ofnomlal examples. Using 
the process described below, this will allow us to decide which clusters are ofnormal traffic and 
which are of intrusive traffic without knowing the actual labels for the examples. 
Using these assumptions we can formulate a strategy for using clustering as a method to 
detect intrusions. We do this by choosing a constant p to represent the percentage of clusters that 
are normal. After applying a clustering algorithm to the data to create many clusters, we order 
the clusters by the number of examples that each contains. We can then choose the largest p 
percent of clusters to label as "normal" and label the remaining clusters as "anomalous." This 
will give us the template which we can now use to label new examples. 
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In order to label a new example, we must start by graphing that example in our example 
space. We should then find the cluster out of all the clusters in the template whose centroid is 
.closest to the example. We can then label the example with the same label as the cluster. 
Therefore, in essence, any new example takes on the label of the cluster it is nearest to. This 
makes sense in context because we would assume that any new example would be similar to 
those examples that are spatially near to it, and thus should have the same label as those nearby 
examples. 
This process led to a modification that does not seem to be specifically addressed in other 
papers. While it certainly makes sense to mark a new example with the same label as its nearest 
cluster, it seems that there should be some contingency for those new examples that are outside 
the width of any cluster. The reason for this is that it might be possible for a new example to be 
very far from any cluster, but closest to a cluster labeled "normal." With the previously 
described algorithm implemented strictly, that example would be marked as "normal" even 
though, instinctively, it should be assumed that an example that is far from anything should be 
marked as an intrusion because, by definition, it is anomalous. Obviously, if a new example is 
far from any cluster but nearest to a cluster marked "anomaly," then there will not be a problem 
because the new example will be rightly labeled as an intrusion. 
The modification that was added to the implementation was a check when the nearest 
cluster centroid is found. By using the same cluster width constant w as previously described, 
we can add the condition that if the distance from the new example to its nearest cluster centroid 
is greater than w, then that new example should be marked as an "intrusion," regardless of the 
cluster's label. However, in running tests, the improvement made by adding this feature was 
negligible. This is presumably due to at least one of two situations. First, it is possible that the 
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template is encompassing enough that it is very rare for any new example to be outside ofevery 
cluster. This would result in nearly every new example being within the threshold of a cluster, 
meaning that there would be no difference in labeling between the two approaches. The other 
reason that there was no significant improvement could be that the cluster or clusters labeled 
"normal" could be fully or near-fully surrounded by clusters labeled "anomaly." This would 
mean that even if a new example were olltside the threshold of any cluster, it would be highly 
unlikely or impossible for that example to be closer to a cluster labeled "normal" than a cluster 
labeled "anomalous." 
3.1 Evaluating Detection Accuracy 
In order to measure the accuracy of a clustering algorithm, a pre-labeled dataset is 
required. The dataset that was used for testing was the KDD Cup 1999 data set [7]. The testing 
process was very straightforward. First, a template was generated using one or more of the 
techniques previously outlined. Then each example was read from the test dataset into my 
program and graphed in the template's example space. Then the algorithm was able to label 
each test example as either "nonnal" or "intrusive" based on its position in relation to the clusters 
in the template. Finally, the label generated by the clustering algorithm for the example could be 
compared to the label provided with the example. However, tests resulting in responses of either 
"right" or "wrong" are not descriptive enough to provide the type of analysis we want to measure 
the accuracy ofour system. We need to be sure that our measure of accuracy will indicate the 
effectiveness of a particular algorithm in a real world intrusion detection setting. Therefore, we 
break the results of a test down into four categories: 
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1.	 True Positive: An example of intrusive traffic, marked as "intrusion" by the 
algorithm. 
2.	 True Negative: An example of normal traffic, marked as "normal" by the algorithm. 
3.	 False Positive: An example ofnonnal traffic, marked as "intrusion" by the algorithm. 
4.	 False Negative: An example of intrusive traffic, marked as "normal" by the 
algorithm. Or in other words, this is an intrusion that was not detected by the system. 
We can then use these types of results to construct a two-part measure of accuracy that will help 
us to analyze the effectiveness of the clustering algorithm. 
There are two numbers that must be considered when analyzing the accuracy of an 
intrusion detection system. The first is the detection rate, which is defined as follows: 
· R TruePositivesDetectzon ate =-----------­(FalseNegatives +TruePositives) 
This equation is equivalent to saying that the Detection Rate is the proportion of True Positives 
to the total number of intrusive examples. Put more plainly, it is the percentage of intrusions that 
are detected out of all of the intrusions that pass through the system. This measure tells us 
whether we are actually detecting an appropriate number of intrusions with our system. 
The second number used in measurement is the false positive rate, defined as follows: 
D l P .. R FaIsePositives 
.ra se osztzve ate =-----------­(FalsePositives +TrueNegatives) 
The false positive rate is the proportion of test examples falsely marked as "intrusive" to the total 
amount ofnonnal traffic. Or, in other words, it is the percentage of the instances of normal 
traffic that are thought by the system to be intrusive traffic. 
Both of these measures are necessary in determining whether an algorithm is suited to use 
in an intrusion detection system. The detection rate indicates how much of the intrusive traffic is 
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detected as intrusive. This is obviously important because it is worthless to have an intrusion 
detection system that fails to detect a majority of intrusions. It is less obvious why the false 
positive rate is important because it seems at first look that we would only be concerned with 
whether or not the system is detecting intrusions. However, if the system marks too many 
instances ofnormal traffic as "intrusive," then network security administrators will spend a great 
deal of time wading through false reports of intrusions, which would probably result in less 
attention paid to reports of intrusion when they arise in the future. 
3.2 Passing Information to Enhance Detection Accuracy 
It was the goal, through the course of this research, to enhance current clustering 
techniques in order to improve accuracy. The method that was explored along this route was that 
ofhow distance is measured in the clustering algorithms. Euclidean distance is the most popular 
choice for a distance measure, but it is certainly not the only choice. An entirely different 
distance algorithm was not used, but instead the possibility for skewing the Euclidean distance 
between points was examined. It was hoped that previously learned knowledge could be used to 
enhance the distance measures to improve the overall accuracy of the intrusion detection system. 
It was desired that the advantages ofusing entirely unlabeled data that were discussed 
earlier be maintained. The method that was developed to pass data while still avoiding using 
expertly generated labels was to run the intrusion detection system successive times, but 
remember the results of each previous run. The way that was devised to have previous 
knowledge impact the next run was to stretch or shrink the distances between point based on 
whether they were marked as anomalous or normal. Therefore, a modified formula for distance 
was created: 
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2-2*PCPOinIB[i]) J2:t (po int Ai] - po int B [i]). scale_factor. ( 1 )
i=1 [ scale_factor
 
In this formula, the value ofP is the proportion of examples with the particular feature value 
pointB[i] that were marked as anomalous in the previous iteration's result. The scale factor is 
some constant value that decides how much stretching or shrinking is to occur. The additional 
portion ofthe formula works in this way: if the proportion P for the feature value pointB[i] is less 
than 50 percent, then it means that less than 50 percent of the examples with that feature value 
were marked as anomalies. For this we could infer that the example we are currently looking at, 
because it has feature value pointB[i], is probably not an anomaly. The smaller the percentage 
for P(pointB[i]), the more likely it is that the current example is not an anomaly. For features 
where P(pointB[i]) is less than 50 percent, the difference between pointAi] and pointB[i] is 
shrunken. IfP(pointB[i]) is zero, meaning that none ofthe examples with that particular feature 
value were marked as anomalous, then the difference will be shrunken to the most extreme 
degree allowed, which is to be divided by the scale factor. The same line of logic can be used for 
values ofP that are greater than 50 percent. In these 
cases, the difference between pointA[i] and pointB[i] is 
stretched. In the case where P(pointB[i]) is one, 
meaning that all of the examples with that particular 
feature value were marked as anomalous, then the 
difference will be stretched to the most extreme degree 
allowed, which is to be multiplied by the scale factor. 
--------~_._---------. 
The graph to the right shows the degree to which the pointB[i] 
Figure 4: Amount ofdistance skew 
difference between feature values is altered for any 
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value ofP. The x-coordinate of the graph represents P, going from zero to one. The y-
coordinate represents the scale factor. The lines show the value that the difference between 
feature values is multiplied by to achieve the altered distance. The steeper line is the graph when 
the scale factor is four. The flatter line is of when the scale factor is two. As the graph shows, 
the higher the likelihood that a particular feature value appears in an example, the more that 
feature will increase the overall distance measure between points. And for any scale factor, if the 
value of P is 50 percent, then the difference is left unchanged. 
Determining the proportion of a discrete feature value that appears in examples marked 
"intrusion" is fairly straightforward. The program is able to easily count the number oftimes the 
feature value appears and how many of those times are in examples marked "intrusion." 
Continuous features, on the other hand, were more complicated. The method devised to evaluate 
the correlation between a particular continuous feature value and its being in an anomalous 
example was to break the range of continuous data into N sections and to find the average 
proportion P for all of the feature values that appear in the same section as the continuous feature 
being analyzed. This is shown in 
to> 
«) 
:.z:I 
o 
the graph in figure 5, to the right, 8 
go 
where the top of the rectangle is the -S 
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It is important to note that the more feature value 
Figure 5: Graph of continuous feattlre value anomaly proportions 
sections the continuous feature 
value space is divided into, the more accurate the algorithm will be. Notice that in the graph, the 
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first rectangle is the average of all the proportions in it, but it is not a very accurate measure for 
those feature values at the extremes of the section's width. However, when the number of 
sections increases, so does the amount of time it takes for the program to look up the value. 
Therefore, when implementing this algorithm, care should be taken to choose a number of 
sections large enough to give good results, but not so large that the program is slowed too much. 
The logic behind this approach derives from the assumption that anomalous data is "far 
away" and that normal data is "close." When the Portnoy algorithm is deciding whether a 
particular data example should be inserted into a given cluster, it measures the distance between 
them and checks whether that distance is within the threshold. If the cluster is of normal data, 
then would want the distance measured between it and a normal example to be small so that the 
normal example is inserted into the cluster. If the example is from an intrusion, we would want 
the distance measured to be large, so that the example would not be placed in the cluster with the 
normal data. By skewing the distances with known information, it was hoped that this would be 
able to increase the likelihood that normal data is placed in normal clusters and abnormal data is 
not put in them. 
While it is true that one could generate the proportions for each feature labeled 
anomalous or normal from the labels provided with the data set, we would like to be able to 
avoid this because, again, this is a use of expert knowledge that we do not want to rely upon in a 
real world IDS situation. Therefore, the technique devised to accomplish this without labeled 
data was to run the IDS algorithm iteratively. After each iteration, the program calculated the 
proportions for each feature labeled anomalous and normal so that this information could be used 
to adjust the distance measures in the next iteration. 
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4 Test Results 
4.1 Results from Tests on the Portnoy Algorithm 
The results from the test runs of the implementation of Portnoy's clustering algorithm 
yielded good results. The first set oftests was used to determine what the best cluster width 
would be. Several test runs were performed with a constant "normal proportion" of 1.0% and 
varying cluster widths. The results, shown in table 1, indicated that a cluster width of about 10.0 
was optimum. 
Cluster Width 5 10 15 20 
DR (FPR) 79.5 (7.014) 78.4 (3.29) 25.3 (0.815) 7.56 (0.47) 
Table 1: Tests to Determme Cluster Width 
The next set of test was used to determine the optimum "normal proportion." I used a 
constant cluster width of 10.0 and varied the proportion. The results, as shown in table 2, 
indicated that a "normal proportion" of about 1.5% was optimal. 
Proportion 1.0% 1.5% 2.0% 15.0% 
DR (FPR) 78.4 (3.29) 78.0 (2.46) 25.3 (1.27) 1.48 (0.19)
 
Table 2: Tests to Determine "Normal Proportion" 
I also performed tests to see if marking all outliers as "intrusion" would result in better 
performance. The results, in table 3, show a small increase in detection accuracy. 
Normal 78.0 (2.46) 
With marking outliers as "intrusion" 79.2 (2.45) 
Table 3: Tests of Marking All Outliers as "Intrusion" 
4.2 Results from Information Passing Tests 
The results from the test runs of my implementation of this distance skewing mechanism 
showed not an increase in accuracy with each iteration, but instead, a dramatic decrease. More 
investigation will be required to determine precisely why this was the case. One possibility 
could be that, in my implementation, when distance was being measured from a cluster to a new 
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example, only the proportion P from the example was used to skew the distance. In other words, 
the likelihood ofthe cluster's center to be an anomaly was not considered. It might, however, be 
more effective to use the proportions from both the cluster's center and the example being 
inserted. In order to do this, the distance equation would have to be altered to include the value 
ofP(pointAi])· 
5 Possible Areas for Further Exploration 
5.1 Automatic generation of "normal proportion" 
Any intrusion detection system will be most useful with as little expert knowledge 
required as possible. We have addressed this issue by choosing to use unsupervised learning 
techniques so that the system is more autonomous. However, we are still required to supply 
values for the cluster width, w, and the proportion of clusters that should be marked as "normal", 
p. The value chosen for the cluster width w seems to have less importance if the example space 
transforn1ation technique introduced by Portnoy is used because it seems that w can be a fixed 
value that will not need to be changed by the end user. However, it is not clear that the "normal 
proportion" p can be fixed in the same way. It might be worth exploring, therefore, whether 
there is a way to choose which clusters are "normal." The way that I thought of, but have not yet 
tried is to separate the largest clusters from the majority of clusters based on standard deviation 
of cluster size. For instance, if a cluster is a size of at least x standard deviations, then that 
cluster should be marked "normal." 
5.2 Fixing the Portnoy algorithm's dependence on data order 
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Another possible area for further exploration is searching for ways to reduce or eliminate 
the inherent flaws in Portnoy's clustering algorithm. The accuracy of clustering will always be 
undermined in this algorithm because of the dependence on the ordering of the data. Ifthere 
were a way to eliminate this dependence, while still maintaining the major advantage in time 
complexity over K-Means, then this could greatly improve the clustering process. The simple 
method that I came up with to accomplish this was, after each new example is inserted into an 
existing cluster, to move that cluster's centroid to its new average. Doing this should, 
theoretically, eliminate the possibility that a cluster's centroid might be far away from the true 
average of the cluster, and thus skewing the way that the algorithm clusters the data. Also, it will 
only increase the algorithm's time complexity slightly. While Portnoy's original algorithm only 
ran through the list of examples once, this change will only add, at most, the run-through of one 
cluster per example added. In an example created for demonstration, the proposed modification 
did indeed solve the problem. The K-Means algorithm still had a slightly different result, but 
certainly not major enough to warrant the huge increase in running time. 
6 Conclusions 
Intrusion detection will continue to be an important area in the field of information 
technology because it is clear that the problem of computer hackers is one that is not going to 
disappear. It also seems evident that anomaly detection will become an increasingly important 
part of the intrusion detection field for the reasons outlined above. The research done for this 
project has confirmed the usefulness of clustering as a tool for use in an intrusion detection 
system. Though the distance skewing method proposed did not yield good results, the general 
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concept should not be ruled out entirely. Also, the questions posed in this paper are worthy of 
further exploration and could potentially increase the effectiveness of clustering even more. 
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